• Linear cryptanalysis studies the correlation between linear combinations of input and output bits of functions.
• In the usual case of (binary additive) stream ciphers -the function under study is a nonlinear combiner function;
-the input bits to the function are bits from LFSR bitstreams;
-the output bits are the keystream bits;
-known plaintext-ciphertext sequences allow us to obtain known keystream. Divide-and-conquer attack
Principles of the correlation attack
• Assume a nonlinear combining generator with N LFSR-s of lengths l 1 , . . . , l N .
• Exhaustive search then has to be performed over
initial states.
• If each of the LFSR streams is correlated with the (known) keystream, we can test each of the LFSR-s separately, so the complexity reduces to
(2 l i − 1).
• Example: the Geffe generator (1973) is defined by three maximum-length LFSR-s and a combining function
• P (z(t) = x 1 (t)) = 3 4 , P (z(t) = x 3 (t)) = 3 4
• If the combining function is correlation immune to the 1 st order, we need to consider the LFSR-s pairwise, etc.
• If a boolean function f is m th order correlation immune, then the nonlinear order of f is at most n − m.
• The correlation immunity-nonlinear order tradeoff can be avoided by e.g.
-irregular clocking, as in the case of A5/1 or -using memory in the function, as in the case of E 0 . A correlation attack on A5/1
• The initial state of the A5/1 generator is a linear function of the key and the frame number (IV).
• Each output bit of an LFSR is a linear combination of key and frame number bits:
• Separate the key and frame number parts in each of the LFSR-s:
• The sequencesk
. . are unknown, but remain the same for all frames.
• The sequencesf 
• Denote the known rhs of (1) for frame j by O j (76,76,76,1)
• Then we obtain a correlation for the key bit combinations:
A refinement of the attack
• The probability of the particular clocking (76, 76, 76, 1) is around 10 −3 .
• The basic attack requires a few million frames (hours of conversation) to determine information about the key.
• Consider now all keystream positions where a clocking triple has a non-negligible probability of occuring and take a weighted decision for each frame:
• To evaluate clocking probabilities, assume that the clock control bits are uniformly distributed independent bits:
• Use the log-likelihood ratio
to estimate the linear combinationk
• Recall that the bitk
is the i th output bit of the LFSR R, when loaded only with key bits.
• If we recover enough (consecutive) bitsk
, we can load them into the registers, clock the cipher (regularly) backwards, load a frame number and check against the known keystream.
• If we consider all clocking triples in an interval of length N , we obtain N 3 linear equations with 3N variables.
• The problem of finding the variables is equivalent to decoding a linear code.
• We need 64 bits of information -exhaustive search over one interval of length at least 22 gives no advantage over brute-force attack.
• Consider instead several shorter intervals, e.g. • We now need to perform exhaustive searches over only 24 variables.
• What if the closest solution is erroneous?
• We can either increase the number of received frames...
• ... or check for T closest solutions.
• T solutions from each interval give T 3 combinations of solutions.
• To reduce the number of solutions to be verified, use overlapping intervals and the properties of the feedback polynomials.
• With parameters N = 9 and T = 1000, the attack has been implemented and gives 75% success probability, using 70000 frames (5 min) of known plaintext. 
The Bluetooth encryption cipher E
• Integer addition over Z 2 defines a nonlinear function with memory whose correlation immunity is maximum.
• This idea was first employed in the summation generator ( • Correlations for the sequence have been identified, e.g. • To mount a correlation attack, we can replace the nonlinear part with a sequence of random variables having certain correlation probability.
• We shall now identify a correlation probability for v t to verify our guess.
• For this, we need to eliminate the influence of the sequence u t .
• The sequence u= (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u N −1 ) has generator matrix G such that u = u 0 G.
• Suppose we are able to find k columns i 1 , . . . , i k in G that add up to a zero-column.
• Then also u t+i 1 + . . . + u t+i k = 0 for any time index t (since the code is cyclic).
• Now
• The attack has two parameters that will influence the length of the received keystream:
-w, the value of the highest index in I (or, in other words, the number of columns required to find k columns that sum to a zero-column) and -m, the number of time samples required to gain statistical significance.
• Theorem Assume a cyclic code with a random generator matrix. The total number of columns, w, required to find k columns that add up to the all-zero column is approximately 2 l k−1 , where l is the number of rows in the matrix.
• Hence, w decreases when k increases.
• On the other hand, when k increases, the probability • Recall that the available keystream from one frame is at most 2745 bits.
• The required length of keystream is found to be > 2 34 bits, thus, the attack cannot be applied on the actual Bluetooth encryption scheme.
